Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court applied the Carroll doctrine^[1] in a case with a significant factual difference—the search took place after the vehicle was moved to the stationhouse. The search was thus delayed and did not take place on the highway (or street) as in Carroll.^[2] After a gas station robbery, a vehicle fitting the description of the robbers' car was stopped. Inside were people wearing clothing matching the description of that worn by the robbers. They were arrested, and the car was taken to the police station where it was later searched.

Opinion of the Court[edit]

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The Court first held that the search could not be sustained as a search incident to arrest (SITA). It quoted at length from Carroll that a search of a movable vehicle is treated differently under the Fourth Amendment because the mobility of the vehicle alone can easily defeat the warrant requirement.^[3] If there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains criminal evidence and there exist exigent circumstances where the vehicle can be removed from the jurisdiction, a warrantless search would be reasonable.^[4] It made no constitutional difference here that the search followed the seizure because the probable cause which developed on the street still existed at the station house (where the vehicle was impounded).^[5] For this purpose, it is significant to note that the automobile exception and the SITA doctrine are quite different. Culdcept saga xbox 360.

See also[edit]

References[edit]

1. ^SeeCarroll v. United States, 267U.S.132 (1925).
2. ^Compare Preston v. United States, 376U.S.364 (1964), and Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391U.S.216 (1968), where the Court held that a search incident could not be conducted later at the stationhouse.
3. ^Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 48-49, quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-54.
4. ^Chambers, 399 U.S. at 50-51: But the circumstances that furnish probable cause to search a particular auto for particular articles are most often unforeseeable; moreover, the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable. Where this is true, as in Carroll and the case before us now, if an effective search is to be made at any time, either the search must be made immediately without a warrant or the car itself must be seized and held without a warrant for whatever period is necessary to obtain a warrant for the search. See also id. at 51 n. 9.
5. ^Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52. Compare United States v. Edwards, 415U.S.800 (1974) (overruled on other grounds by United States v. Chadwick, 433U.S.1 (1977) and diverged from by California v. Acevedo, 500U.S.565 (1991) (a delayed seizure of clothing from an arrestee was not an unreasonable search), and United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397U.S.249 (1970) (delay of mail in transit to allow probable cause to develop).

Further reading[edit]

Chambers is discussed in:

• Note, 75 Dick L Rev 511 (1971);
• Note, 46 Ind L J 257 (1971);
• Comment, 47 Notre Dame Law 668 (1972);
• Note, 7 Tulsa L J 197 (1971);
• Note, 23 Vand L Rev 1370 (1970).
• Heisse, Warrantless Automobile Searches and Telephonic Search Warrants: Should the Automobile Exception be Redrawn?, 7 Hast Const L Q 1031 (1980).

External links[edit]

• Text of Chambers v. Maroney, 399U.S. 42 (1970) is available from: JustiaLibrary of CongressOyez (oral argument audio)

The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday ruled in favor of Samsung in its longstanding smartphone design lawsuit with Apple, reversing a $399 million damages judgment awarded to Apple by a lower court. The case will now return to the U.S. Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

Supreme Court judges unanimously decided they do not have enough info to say whether damages paid to Apple should be based on the total device, or rather individual components like the front bezel or the screen. It urged the U.S. Court of Appeals to reconsider the $399 million penalty Samsung paid in 2012.

Absent adequate briefing by the parties, this Court declines to resolve whether the relevant article of manufacture for each design patent at issue here is the smartphone or a particular smartphone component. Doing so is not necessary to resolve the question presented, and the Federal Circuit may address any remaining issues on remand.

The lawsuit dates back to 2011, when Apple successfully sued Samsung for infringing upon the iPhone's patented design, including its rectangular front face with rounded edges and grid of colorful icons on a black screen. Apple's damages were awarded based on Samsung's entire profit from the sale of its infringing smartphones.

Calvin Klein, Dieter Rams, Norman Foster, and over 100 other top designers backed Apple in August, arguing the iPhone maker is entitled to all profits Samsung has earned from infringing designs. They cited a 1949 study showing more than 99% of Americans could identify a bottle of Coca-Cola by shape alone.

Update: Apple has provided a statement on the ruling to TechCrunch, stating that the company will continue to protect the work that's gone into the iPhone's design.

The question before the Supreme Court was how to calculate the amount Samsung should pay for their copying. Our case has always been about Samsung’s blatant copying of our ideas, and that was never in dispute. We will continue to protect the years of hard work that has made iPhone the world’s most innovative and beloved product. We remain optimistic that the lower courts will again send a powerful signal that stealing isn’t right.